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QUESTION PRESENTED
1. When evaluating whether a law enforcement
officer is entitled to qualified immunity in a case
involving a falsehood or material omission in a
warrant affidavit, whether the nature of the corrected
affidavit and its effect on probable cause are questions
of fact or law?
2. Whether qualified immunity is available to law
enforcement officers who intentionally include a
falsehood or material omission in a warrant affidavit?

ii
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS
The Petitioner in this case is Thomas A Bowden,
an individual. Petitioner was the plaintiff and
appellee below.
The Respondents are:
Steve Meinberg, an officer with the Jefferson
County, Missouri Sherriff’s office;
Patrick Hawkins, an officer with the Jefferson
County, Missouri Sherriff’s office;
Chris Hoffman, an officer with the Jefferson
County, Missouri Sherriff’s office;
Benjamin Simmons, an individual;
Aaron Gyurica, an individual; and
Wes Wagner, the Jefferson County, Missouri
circuit clerk.
The Respondents were defendants and appellants
below.
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PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Petitioner Thomas A. Bowden respectfully
petitions this Court for a writ of certiorari to review
judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit in this case.
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the Eighth Circuit is reported at
807 F.3d 877, and is reproduced at page 1a of the
appendix to this petition (“App.”). The unpublished
opinion of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Missouri is reproduced at page 11a
of the appendix.
JURISDICTION
The Eighth Circuit rendered its decision on
August 25, 2015. Bowden filed a timely petition for
rehearing en banc on September 22, 2015 after
receiving an extension of time to file the petition, and
the court denied the petition on October 22, 2015. On
December 16, 2015, Justice Alito granted an
application to extend the time in which to file this
petition until February 19, 2015. This Court has
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
The text of the relevant statutes is set forth in the
appendix to this petition.
INTRODUCTION
The Eighth Circuit granted qualified immunity to
a sheriff’s deputy who filled out a probable cause
report relying exclusively on a witness statement he
later admitted he believed to be false. The deputy did
not inform the prosecutor or magistrate of his belief,
and Thomas Bowden was arrested as a result. Yet the
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Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of
qualified immunity, concluding that a corrected
affidavit still “could lead a man of reasonable caution
to infer” that a crime had occurred. App. 8a (emphasis
added). In the Second and Third Circuits, an officer
in similar circumstances is entitled to qualified
immunity only if “a magistrate would have issued the
warrant on the basis of the corrected affidavits.”
Southerland v. City of N.Y., 680 F.3d 127, 144 (2d Cir.
2011) (emphasis added) (quoting Walczyk v. Rio, 496
F.3d 139, 158 (2d Cir. 2007)); see also Sherwood v.
Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396, 401 (3d Cir. 1997) (noting
that qualified is available only if a magistrate could
not conclude that a corrected affidavit was
insufficient). Other circuits have developed still more
standards. The Ninth Circuit joins the Eighth in
rendering corrected affidavits issues of law, and the
Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits treat the questions
as mixed questions of fact and law, whereby a jury
must resolve disputed underlying facts, but the court
determines whether probable cause existed in light of
the corrected affidavit.
The circuits’ disagreement reflects a broader
division among the circuits about the role of a jury in
determining the nature and effect of a corrected
affidavit in the qualified immunity context. While
each of the circuits borrows its rule of decision in these
cases from this Court’s test in Franks v. Delaware,
they do so without any guidance on how that criminal
case’s test should interact with the standards of
summary judgment and qualified immunity in a civil
action. Consequently, the circuit courts’ various
approaches to these claims diverge significantly.
As a result, falsehoods and material omissions in
warrant affidavits are far less likely to be
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compensable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the Eighth and
Ninth Circuits than they are in other circuits have
decided the issue. And unfortunately, falsehoods and
material omissions in warrant affidavits are an alltoo-common occurrence. Resolving these issues would
create uniformity in the many cases requiring a
corrected affidavit, and it would provide needed
guidance to the lower courts.
This Court should grant certiorari and resolve
this conflict among the circuits. By failing to draw all
reasonable inferences in the petitioner’s favor while
reconstructing and interpreting the warrant affidavit,
the Eighth Circuit improperly took his case out of a
jury’s hands.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Factual Background: In 2009, Petitioner Thomas
Bowden lived with his wife in a “very rural” part of
Jefferson County, Missouri. (JA 171). The subdivision
where their home was located was accessible only by
one private gravel road, which crosses a creek via a
low water bridge near the Bowdens’ property. (JA
171). Prior to the events giving rise to this case, illegal
activity, including trespassing and manufacture of
methamphetamine, was common in the area around
the Bowdens’ home. (JA 118-120, 181).
One morning in July, Bowden and his wife saw a
pickup truck and two men they did not recognize on
the low water bridge at the edge of the Bowdens’ yard.
(JA 181, 118). Bowden called out loudly three times
for the men to identify themselves, but they did not
respond. (JA 118, 122, 181). Bowden went inside and
got a single-shot 20-gauge shotgun, loaded with a
single shell. (JA 122, 181). He went back outside and
called to the two men once or twice more, but they did
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not answer. (JA 122). Bowden saw one of the men
make a “really quick movement like he was reaching
into the truck to get something,” and was afraid that
the man was reaching for a gun, so Bowden fired his
shotgun in the air. (JA 118, 122). Bowden was
confident that the shotgun shell couldn’t have hurt
anyone at that distance; he simply wanted to get the
man’s attention and make him stop, which he did. (JA
118). Looking at the men, Bowden was facing west; he
pointed the shotgun south over his shed, about a 110
degree angle from the men, when he fired. (JA 122-23,
181).
The two men on the bridge were Respondent
Benjamin Simmons and Respondent Aaron Gyurica.
Simmons admits that when he heard the shotgun
blast, he was more curious than frightened, and
thought Bowden was shooting at a squirrel or
something similar. (JA 469). Simmons walked up the
road toward Bowden’s home and asked Bowden “Did
you get him?” which Bowden took to mean that
Simmons thought he had shot at an animal. (JA 12324). Bowden asked Simmons his name and what
Simmons was doing there. (JA 124). Simmons
explained
that
his
step-grandmother
and
grandmother lived up the road, and he had been
coming to the area to fish since the early 1980s. (JA
123-24, 488). During this conversation Bowden held
the shotgun in his hands, pointed away from
Simmons. (JA 125, 498). When he learned that
Bowden had fired the shot to get his attention,
Simmons “went ballistic” and started “cussing and
carrying on.” (JA 124-25). Simmons threatened
Bowden and said “we will see what will get done about
this.” (JA 125).

5
Simmons and Gyurica drove up the road to the
home of Barbara Voyles, Simmons’ step-grandmother,
where Simmons called 911 and reported that Bowden
had shot at him. (JA 125). Bowden called 911 as well.
(JA 126). Respondent Vernon Martin, a deputy county
sheriff, arrived to investigate, and spoke to Bowden,
Simmons, and Gyurica. (JA 236-252). Deputy Martin
recalls that Simmons, insisting that Martin arrest
Bowden, was aggressive and agitated, “almost to the
point where he wanted to tell me how to do my job.”
(JA 175). Both Simmons and Gyurica admitted to
Deputy Martin that they did not see Bowden shoot the
gun at them; their only evidence that Bowden had
fired the shotgun at them was the fact that they heard
a gunshot and then saw leaves falling near them. (JA
176-77, 499-502). Deputy Martin noted that their
descriptions of the incident were “very vague.” (JA
188). Additionally, they gave Deputy Martin an
incorrect description of Bowden’s shotgun. Simmons
said Bowden had a 12-gauge pump-action shotgun;
Bowden’s shotgun was a single-barrel 20-gauge
loaded with fieldshot for hunting small game. (JA 17677). Deputy Martin did not find Simmons credible.
(JA 178-79). However, Deputy Martin did find
Bowden credible. (JA 183). After fully investigating
and consulting the Missouri statutes, Deputy Martin
told all the parties that he did not believe that Bowden
had committed any crime, and did not intend to write
a report or bring any charges. (JA 180, 185, 191, 21920, 275, 457).
Unfortunately for Bowden, the Simmons family
had powerful friends. The Simmons family knew
Howard Wagner, the elected Circuit Clerk of Jefferson
County, and his family. (JA 271-72, 451-42). Simmons’
step-grandmother, Barbara Voyles, worked with
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Howard’s father, and is a long-time family friend of
the Wagners. Benjamin Simmons’ mother, Norma
Elaine Simmons, worked for the Jefferson County
Recorder of Deeds, in the same building as Wagner.
(JA 451-52). When Deputy Martin told Norma
Simmons and Barbara Voyles that he did not intend
to charge Bowden, Norma and Barbara threatened to
call the Circuit Clerk and have him call the Sheriff’s
Department to have “something done about this.” (JA
211-13, 274, 457-58). Martin dismissed these threats
and left the scene. (JA 458).
Later that morning, Deputy Martin spoke with his
supervising officer, Corporal Chris Hoffman and
explained his doubts about Simmons’ credibility and
his opinion that Bowden had not committed any
crime. (JA 187-89). Regardless, Hoffman ordered
Deputy Martin to go back to Bowden’s home, read him
his rights, seize his shotgun, and write a report for the
unlawful use of a firearm. (JA 189-90). Hoffman told
Deputy Martin that someone from Barbara Voyles’
home had called Howard Wagner, that Wagner had
called Respondent Lieutenant Colonel Meinberg, who
then called Respondent Lieutenant Patrick Hawkins,
who in turn called Hoffman and relayed the order to
seize the shotgun and draft a probable cause
statement charging Bowden with the unlawful use of
a weapon. (JA 190). Hoffman also told Deputy Martin
to draft the probable cause statement and not worry;
Hoffman doubted anything would come of it. (JA 197).
Deputy Martin would not have written and signed
a probable cause statement had Hoffman not ordered
him to do so. (JA 193-94, 196-97). Nevertheless, he
complied with his orders. He drafted the probable
cause statement averring that he believed probable
cause existed that Bowden had committed the crime
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of unlawful use of a weapon. (JA 196, 243). He seized
Bowden’s shotgun and told Bowden that Deputy
Martin’s superiors were just trying to “appease Mrs.
Voyles or whoever over there.” (JA 130). Apparently,
though, the county’s purpose exceeded appeasement:
the local prosecutor’s office issued a Complaint and
Request for Warrant, based on Deputy Martin’s
affidavit, charging Bowden with the unlawful use of a
weapon, a Class D felony. (JA 285, 287). A warrant
was issued for Bowden’s arrest, and he turned himself
in to the Sheriff’s Department. (JA 131). The Sheriff’s
Department arrested Bowden and detained him until
he posted bond. (JA 131). The local prosecutor offered
a plea deal that both Bowden and his defense attorney
considered “ridiculous,” but fortunately a jury
acquitted him after a trial on June 25, 2010. (JA 133).
Proceedings Below: In December 2013, Bowden
filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Missouri alleging a deprivation of his
Fourth Amendment rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983, among other claims, against Respondent
Deputy Martin, Lieutenant Colonel Steve Meinberg,
Lieutenant Patrick Hawkins, Corporal Chris
Hoffman, and Circuit Clerk Wes Wagner, and
conspiracy and other claims against Respondents
Benjamin Simmons and Aaron Gyurica. App 5a.
Defendants moved for summary judgment on the
basis of qualified immunity, which the District Court
denied. App 6a. The District Court found that a
genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether
Deputy Martin had probable cause that Bowden had
committed a crime, such that Bowden’s claim merited
a jury trial. App 6a.
Respondents filed an interlocutory appeal to
the Eighth Circuit appealing the denial of qualified
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immunity. The Eighth Circuit panel reversed and
remanded, concluding that the Respondents were
entitled to qualified immunity against Bowden’s
Fourth Amendment claims. App. 9a.
The court rejected Bowden’s argument that
Deputy Martin violated Bowden’s Fourth Amendment
rights by drafting the probable cause statement when
Deputy Martin knew the facts did not support
probable cause to arrest Bowden for a crime. The court
reasoned that “[w]hether probable cause existed…is
an objective question of law.” Id. at 881. And then it
went on to weigh the facts. A dispute of fact centered
on whether an objective magistrate would believe
Bowden shot a gun at the men, based on the men’s
testimony. App 8a. Despite the fact that any
corrected affidavit would include Officer Martin’s
evaluation that the men were not credible and that
there was no probable cause (and in any event, a
corrected affidavit likely should not have included the
men’s claims at all), the Eighth Circuit determined
that an objective magistrate could find as a matter of
law that Bowdend did shoot at the men. App. 9a.
In its weighing of the facts, the court found it
irrelevant that Deputy Martin’s probable cause
statement omitted the facts that Simmons and
Gyurica did not see Bowden fire the shotgun and that
Bowden said he fired in a direction away from the
men. App. 8a. The court concluded that Bowden
shouting at Simmons and Gyurica and leaves falling
above them could by itself support a reasonable
objective belief that Bowden shot at the men, and thus
probable cause that Bowden had committed a crime.
Id. Since Deputy Martin purportedly did not violate
Bowden’s Fourth Amendment right against
unreasonable seizure by including false information
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in his probable cause report, Bowden’s conspiracy
claim failed as well. App. 9a. The Eighth Circuit
subsequently denied panel and en banc rehearing.
App 33a.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
I. THE CIRCUITS ARE DEEPLY DIVIDED ON
HOW TO APPLY FRANKS v. DELAWARE IN
CIVIL RIGHTS CASES.
This case is about preserving the jury’s role as a
factfinder in civil rights cases when a defendant
claims
qualified
immunity
despite
making
deliberately misleading statements or omissions in a
warrant affidavit. Two circuits—the Second and the
Third—have long held that whether a hypothetical,
corrected affidavit would support probable cause is a
question of fact. Consequently, when a defendant
claims qualified immunity at the summary judgment
stage, those courts require that all inferences be
resolved in the plaintiff’s favor and grant immunity
only if there is no genuine dispute that the magistrate
still would have granted the warrant. In the Ninth
Circuit, the affiant’s deliberate or reckless disregard
for the truth is a fact question, but probable cause is
exclusively a question of law. At the summary
judgment stage, courts in that circuit reconstruct an
affidavit to correct any errors that the plaintiff
identified as being at least recklessly false through a
“substantial showing” before conclusively resolving
probable cause. Other circuits take an intermediate
approach. The Fifth, the Sixth and the Seventh
Circuits ask whether any reasonable jury could find a
set of deliberate or reckless misstatements or
omissions that would not support probable cause.
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In reversing the district court, the Eighth Circuit
drew several critical inferences in the defendant
affiant’s favor. The Ninth Circuit might have been
able to reach that same outcome because the court has
exclusive say over how a magistrate might have
interpreted a warrant. Whether the Fifth, the Sixth
or the Seventh Circuits’ standard would have
permitted the same outcome is less clear; at least one
of the Eighth Circuit’s conclusions in this case would
be expressly foreclosed by earlier precedents from the
Fifth and Seventh Circuits. In the Second and Third
Circuits, however, the same conclusions reached by
the court below would have required submitting
Bowden’s case to a jury.
A. The Circuits disagree about the proper role
of a jury in resolving Fourth Amendment
claims predicated upon misleading warrant
affidavits.
In Franks v. Delaware, this Court established the
limited circumstances in which a criminal defendant
could challenge the validity of a search warrant based
on an applicant’s misleading affidavit. 438 U.S. 154,
171-72 (1978). A criminal defendant is entitled to a
suppression hearing only if he can support a specific
allegation of the affiant’s deliberate or reckless
Id. at 171.
falsehoods with an offer of proof.
Moreover, a suppression hearing is required only
when these falsehoods are so material that the rest of
the affidavit’s content is insufficient to support a
finding of probable cause. Id. at 171-72. When the
defendant ultimately establishes the affiant’s
deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the
truth by a preponderance of the evidence, at the
hearing and the affidavit’s remaining content is
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insufficient, the fruits of the search must be excluded.
Id. at 156.
While Franks sets forth a clear rule of criminal
procedure, the Court did not expressly address
whether its test would apply in civil suits.
Nevertheless, the circuit courts generally borrow the
Franks test for their rule of decision in civil rights
suits based on misleading warrant affidavits. See
Burke v. Town of Walpole, 405 F.3d 66, 82 (1st Cir.
2005) (“Appellate courts have consistently held that
the Franks standard for suppression of evidence
informs the scope of qualified immunity in a civil
damages suit against officers who allegedly procure a
warrant based on an untruthful application.”). See
generally Hernandez-Cuevas v. Taylor, 723 F.3d 91,
99-102 (1st Cir. 2013) (discussing different circuit’s
approaches to Fourth Amendment malicious
prosecution claims and the role Franks plays in
establishing the “kind of reprehensible behavior that
is indistinguishable from the common law element of
malice”).
The circuit courts thus redeveloped the Franks
test as a rule of decision in civil rights cases and
decided on their own how that test interacts with the
standards for summary judgment and qualified
immunity. And because they did so without any
guidance from this Court, their approaches vary
substantially. Compare Hervey v. Estes, 65 F.3d 784,
789 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the materiality of a
warrant affidavit’s misstatements or omissions is a
matter for the court), with Velardi v. Walsh, 40 F.3d
569, 574 (2d. Cir. 1994) (holding that the weight a
neutral magistrate would give such information is a
jury matter).
At its narrowest, the circuits’
disagreement centers on the showing a plaintiff must
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make before he can bring his claim to trial; more
fundamentally, the circuits disagree about the proper
role of a jury in deciding these claims. See Sherwood
v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396, 401 n.4 (3d Cir. 1997)
(noting the “tension [that] exists as to the proper role
of the judge and jury where qualified immunity is
asserted”
in
Fourth
Amendment
malicious
prosecution claims).
1. In both the Second and Third Circuits, juries
assess the weight a neutral magistrate would have
assigned to the facts in an affidavit after its
misstatements and omissions are corrected. See
Sherwood, 113 F.3d at 401; Velardi, 40 F.3d at 574. In
those courts, qualified immunity shields a warrant
affiant from liability for his intentional or reckless
misstatements only if a magistrate would have
granted a warrant even after viewing the facts in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Southerland
v. City of N.Y., 680 F.3d 127, 144 (2d Cir. 2011).
The Second Circuit has held that “[t]he
materiality of a misrepresentation or an omission” in
a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim “is
a mixed question of law and fact.” Velardi, 40 F.3d at
574. Under that court’s precedents, an omission’s
relevance to the probable cause determination is a
question of law resolved by the court. Walczyk v. Rio,
496 F.3d 139, 158 (2d Cir. 2007). “‘[T]he weight that
a neutral magistrate would likely have given such
information,’ however, is a question for the
factfinder.” Southerland, 680 F.3d at 144 (quoting
Velardi, 40 F.3d at 574); see Golino v. City of New
Haven, 950 F.3d 864, 872 (2d Cir. 1991). In essence,
the factfinder is asked to predict whether the
magistrate still would have issued a warrant based on
an affidavit he never read. See Velardi, 40 F.3d at 574
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n.1 (“[T]ry[ing] to predict whether a magistrate would
have found probable cause if he had been presented
with truthful information . . . is a question of fact
rather than of law.”).
The Second Circuit therefore grants qualified
immunity “only if ‘the evidence, viewed in the light
most favorable to the plaintiffs, discloses no genuine
dispute that a magistrate would have issued the
warrant on the basis of the corrected affidavits.’”
Southerland, 680 F.3d at 144 (quoting Walczyk, 496
F.3d at 158). At the summary judgment stage, any
genuine doubt over whether the magistrate would
have issued the warrant must be resolved in favor of
the nonmovant. Velardi, 496 F.3d at 574. So long as
the affiant’s misstatement or omission was relevant
and either deliberate or reckless, the plaintiff survives
a defendant’s motion for summary judgment when
such a genuine dispute over the magistrate’s decision
exists. Id.
In Sherwood v. Mulvihill, the Third Circuit
similarly observed that “[t]ypically, the existence of
probable cause in a section 1983 action is a question
of fact.” 113 F.3d at 401. A defendant affiant is
entitled to summary judgment or qualified immunity
only “if the evidence, viewed most favorably to the
plaintiff” would support finding that “that a
reasonable municipal court judge, presented with the
corrected affidavit, could not conclude that the
affidavit was insufficient.” Id. The Third Circuit does
not require submitting “trivial” omissions to the jury
if they “are not strong enough to undermine a finding
of probable cause,” see Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781,
791-92 (3d Cir. 2000). But the court insists that
district courts interpret the record in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff when an affiant claims
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qualified immunity. See, e.g., Reedy v. Evanson, 615
F.3d 197, 215-16 (3d Cir. 2010) (concluding that the
district court “erred in its reconstruction of the
Affidavit because it failed to consistently interpret the
record in the light most favorable to Reedy and
instead, contrary to the summary judgment standard,
occasionally adopted interpretations that were the
least favorable to Reedy”).
2. The Second and the Third Circuits’ application
of Franks to civil rights cases stands in direct conflict
to that of the Ninth Circuit. There, correcting an
affidavit and determining probable cause is
exclusively a function of the court. See Ewing v. City
of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1224 (9th Cir. 2009)
(“[T]he court must determine the materiality of the
allegedly false statements or omissions.”); Butler v.
Elle, 281 F.3d 1014, 1024 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Materiality
is for the court, state of mind is for the jury.”).
“The practical effect” of the Ninth Circuit’s rule “is
to reserve to the court the issue of the materiality of
the false statements.” Hervey, 65 F.3d at 789. On the
defendant affiant’s motion for summary judgment, the
district court adopts a reconstructed affidavit,
correcting facts that the plaintiff “demonstrate[s]
through a substantial showing of evidence were
falsely included in the [original] affidavit.” See id. at
790.1 The court then determines “whether the
1 Significantly, the Ninth Circuit did not suggest in Hervey that

it would draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor
when evaluating his “substantial showing” at the summary
judgment stage. See 65 F.3d at 790. Indeed, the court did not
discuss the ordinary standard at summary judgment at all. The
court instead noted that when a plaintiff alleges a Fourth
Amendment claim similar to a Franks claim, he must meet a
“heightened pleading standard” and a “still higher standard to

15
affidavit, once corrected and supplemented,
establishes probable cause.” Ewing, 588 F.3d at 1224.
3. The rest of the circuits fall somewhere between
the purely legal determination of the Ninth Circuit
and the primarily factual determination of the Second
and the Third Circuits. Some circuits acknowledge
that their case law in this area is less than clear. See,
e.g., Hale v. Kart, 396 F.3d 721, 728 (6th Cir. 2005)
(“We admit that some of these Sixth Circuit cases are
confusing and many of the factual recitals in them do
not lend themselves to a clear understanding of
exactly what facts were in dispute.”). But in general,
these other circuits require that factfinders resolve a
variety of questions including:


Whether the affiant made statements that
were false or misleading when applying for
a warrant, see, e.g., Hart v. Mannina, 798
F.3d 578, 583 (7th Cir. 2015) (“A reasonable
jury [could not] find that the lead detective
. . . made false or misleading statements in
her probable cause affidavit.”);



Whether the affiant reasonably relied in
good faith on statements that later proved
false, see, e.g., Clanton v. Cooper, 129 F.3d
1147, 1154 (10th Cir. 1997) (noting that
triable issues of fact remained where
plaintiff alleged that a defendant affiant
deliberately relied on a confession he knew
to be false); and



Whether
the
affiant’s
misleading
statements were made knowingly or with
reckless disregard for the truth, see, e.g.,

survive summary judgment.” Id. at 788.
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Betker v. Gomez, 692 F.3d 854, 860 (7th

Cir. 2012) (“[A] reasonable jury could find
that Officer Gomez knowingly or with
reckless disregard for the truth made false
statements in his affidavit.”).
After the factfinder resolves these issues, the
court determines whether the corrected warrant
would have supported probable cause. Hale, 396 F.3d
at 728. At the summary judgment stage, a court can
grant summary judgment only if all of the challenged
misstatements would be immaterial.
See, e.g.,
Betker, 692 F.3d at 861-62 (analyzing whether a
corrected affidavit would support probable cause in
light of those misstatements or omissions a jury might
reasonably have found); Kerns v. Bader, 663 F.3d
1173, 1188 (10th Cir. 2011) (requiring that courts
excise all alleged false statements and insert alleged
omissions before reviewing the corrected affidavit for
probable cause).
In the Fifth Circuit, for instance, juries are
responsible for resolving the “facts relied upon to show
probable cause” while judges decide the ultimate
issue. See Garris v. Rowland, 678 F.2d 1264, 1270
(5th Cir. 1982). While courts may address whether
probable cause exists when the evidence is not in
dispute, factual disputes “must be resolved by the jury
before controlling legal principles can be applied.” Id.
Likewise, in the Sixth Circuit, “probable cause
determinations are legal determinations that should
be made by a court.” Hale, 396 F.3d at 728. A plaintiff
can survive a defendant affiant’s motion for summary
judgment on grounds of qualified immunity if a
genuine factual dispute about the warrant affidavit’s
contents exists. See id. (“[A] jury trial is appropriate
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where reasonable disputes of material fact exist on
facts underlying a probable cause determination.”).
But even if the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim
proceeds to trial, “the jury does not decide whether the
facts it has found are legally sufficient to amount to
probable cause or entitlement to qualified immunity.”

Id.

The Seventh Circuit’s approach differs slightly in
that courts can grant qualified immunity even where
a factual dispute exists—so long as the evidence is
viewed and inferences are resolved in the plaintiff’s
favor. See, e.g., Molina ex rel. Molina v. Cooper, 325
F.3d 963, 968-69 (7th Cir. 2003) (agreeing that an
informant’s statement should be disregarded in a
corrected affidavit but determining that probable
cause still would have existed).
A statement or
omission’s materiality is a question of law, while the
statement’s actual veracity and an affiant’s state of
mind are both questions of fact. See, e.g., Betker, 692
F.3d at 861-62 (7th Cir. 2012) (“A reasonable jury
could find that Officer Gomez knowingly or with
reckless disregard for the truth made false or
misleading statements. So we must decide whether
probable cause would have existed . . . absent those
disputed statements.”). At the summary judgment
stage, a defendant affiant is entitled to qualified
immunity unless the plaintiff shows a “reasonable
probability” that the inclusion of omitted information
would have led to a different outcome. See Molina ex
rel. Molina v. Cooper, 325 F.3d 963, 970 (7th Cir.
2003) (citing United States v. McNeese, 901 F.2d 585,
595 (7th Cir. 1990)).
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B. In either the Second or the Third Circuits,
the conclusions reached below would entitle
Bowden to a jury trial.
The
lower
court’s
conclusion
that
“[c]ircumstantial evidence . . . could lead a man of
reasonable caution to infer” a crime had been
committed,” App. 8a., would have been sufficient on
its face to send Bowden’s case to a jury in either the
Second or the Third Circuits. If a reasonable person
could infer that this evidence indicated that Petitioner
fired at the apparent trespassers, one could also infer
that it indicated no such thing. Where two or more
inferences are reasonably possible, the Second and the
Third Circuits instruct that the case must be
determined at trial. See Southerland, 680 F.3d at 144
(observing that qualified immunity is appropriate
only if there is “no genuine dispute that a magistrate
would have issued the warrant); Sherwood, 113 F.3d
at 401 (noting that while probable cause is a question
of fact, a court may resolve the question only if the
evidence could not support concluding that the
corrected affidavit was insufficient).
The difference between “would” and “could” here
is, practically speaking, the difference between actual
probable cause and arguable probable cause.
Notwithstanding a warrant affiant’s deliberate or
reckless misstatements or omission, the Eighth
Circuit will grant entitled to qualified immunity “if he
had ‘merely arguable probable cause,’ which is a
mistaken but objectively reasonable belief the suspect
committed a criminal offense.” Dowell v. Lincoln
Cnty., 762 F.3d 770, 777 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting
McCabe v. Parker, 608 F.3d 1068, 1078 (8th Cir.
2010)). But by insisting that “summary judgment is
inappropriate in doubtful cases,” Velardi, 740 F.3d at
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574, the Second and Third Circuits require actual
probable cause to grant summary judgment.2 See
generally McColley v. Cnty of Rensselaer, 740 F.3d
817, 831 (2d Cir. 2014) (Calabresi, J., concurring)
(noting that granting qualified immunity at summary
judgment whenever probable cause is debatable
would “conflict[] with the clear holding of Velardi that
‘doubtful cases’ must be sent to a jury”).
As Judge Calabresi noted in McColley, arguable
probable cause necessarily exists whenever
reasonable people could disagree about the existence
of actual probable cause. Id. And the consequence of
granting qualified immunity whenever arguable
probable cause exists is that “no case of this sort
should ever go to a jury.” Id.
Functionally, granting qualified immunity on
arguable qualified immunity reverses the standard of
summary judgment, requiring the court to draw
reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.
Cf. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59
(1970) (requiring that all reasonable inferences be
drawn in favor of the nonmoving party at summary
judgment).
“[I]ntroducing reasonableness as a
separate step . . . give[s] defendants a second bite at
the immunity apple, thereby thwarting a careful
balance that the Supreme Court has struck.” Walczyk
2 A line of Second Circuit cases starting with Escalera v. Lunn suggested

that arguable probable cause is the appropriate standard in that court. See
361 F.3d 737, 744 (2d Cir. 2004); see also McColley, 740 F.3d at 829
(Calabresi, J., concurring) (“Escalera is important . . . for having first made
‘arguable probable cause’ part of the corrected affidavits doctrine in our
Circuit.”). But the court limited Escalera to prevent “the doctrine of
arguable probable cause [from] swallow[ing] the entire rule of qualified
immunity as well as the related limitation on our jurisdiction.” See
McColley 740 F.3d at 825-26 (opinion of the court).
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v. Rio, 496 F.3d 139, 169 (2d Cir. 2007) (Sotomayor,
J., concurring).
Additionally, the court below resolved an
inference in the defendants’ favor when it concluded
that Bowden’s own statement to officer Martin could
be considered inculpatory. See App. 8a. By contrast,
the Third Circuit explained in Reedy v. Evanson that
such an inference ran contrary to the summary
judgment standard. See 615 F.3d at 215-18 (“[T]he
[district court] erred in deciding that certain facts
were inculpatory when they were either irrelevant or
even exculpatory.”).
In Reedy, the court ruled that a district court must
draw all inferences in the plaintiff’s favor when
interpreting a reconstructed affidavit at the summary
judgment stage. Id. at 215. In that case, an officer
applied for a warrant to arrest a victim for allegedly
fabricating her rape. See id. at 202-04, 208. After the
rapist confessed to the attack and Reedy was released,
she sued the officer for filing a misleading affidavit in
obtaining the arrest warrant. Id. at 209. At summary
judgment, the district court concluded that while a
reasonable jury could find that the officer’s affidavit
was deliberately or recklessly false, probable cause
could still exist if certain facts were interpreted as
inculpatory. Id. at 214-15. Reversing, the Third
Circuit explained that “the District Court erred in its
application of the summary judgment standard” by
interpreting facts as inculpatory even though the
“conduct was susceptible of innocent explanation.” Id.
at 218 (internal quotations omitted).
In this case, the Eighth Circuit improperly
interpreted Bowden’s statement as inculpatory under
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Mo. Rev. Stat. § 571.030.1(4) (2009).3 See App. 8a.
This inference was simply unwarranted. Critically,
the statute requires that the defendant exhibit the
weapon “in an angry or threatening manner.” §
571.030.1(4).
But as even the Eighth Circuit
recognized, Bowden’s statement does not indicate that
he was angry or threatening; rather, it suggested only
that “he purposefully fired the gun” in the opposite
direction of the apparent trespassers and that “he
thought their behavior was suspicious.” App. 9a.
Implicit in the Eighth Circuit’s holding on this
issue is the conclusion that there would always be
probable cause to believe that any discharge of a
firearm was angry or threatening. Sensibly, Missouri
state courts have never construed the statute so
broadly—and the cases relied upon by the Eighth
Circuit do not suggest they would. In State v. Rogers,
for instance, a court concluded that the defendant
violated § 571.030.1(4) by firing into the air because
the “[d]efendant testified that the first shot was
intended to scare the entire crowd of people.” 976
S.W.2d 529, 532 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (emphasis
added). In State v. Johnson, the court affirmed the
defendant’s conviction because after a loud, angry

confrontation, he shot the complaining witness’s car
four times while she watched. See 964 S.W.2d 465,

467 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998). Bowden’s statement to
Martin did not carry a similar, necessary implication
that he was angry or intended to threaten the
apparent trespassers—indeed, the purported victims
3 The statute at issue prohibits “[1] exhibit[ing], [2] in the

presence of one or more persons, [3] any weapon readily capable
of lethal use [4] in an angry or threatening manner” as the crime
“unlawful use of weapons.” Mo. Rev. Stat. 571.030.1(4) (2009).
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did not interpret it as a threat at the time—and to the
extent the defendants might argue that it could carry
that implication, that is a question for the factfinder.
C. While the court below concluded that
Martin’s belief about the apparent
trespassers’ credibility was irrelevant, the
Fifth, the Seventh, and the Tenth Circuits
regard this as a triable issue of fact.
The Eighth Circuit’s holding below would not
survive scrutiny even under the intermediate
standards employed by the Fifth, the Seventh, and the
Tenth Circuits. The Eighth Circuit disregarded
arguments crucial to Bowden’s case, concluding that
Officer Martin’s admission that his affidavit relied
exclusively on a witness statement he did not believe
was simply irrelevant.
Much of Bowden’s complaint is without
merit, because [they] focus[ ] on Martin's
subjective beliefs. There was no falsehood
in Martin's report that “[a]ccording to the
victim's ... Bowden shoot at them,” because
this was an accurate report of what
Simmons and Gyurica told him. That
Martin personally did not believe the men
was not relevant to the existence of
probable cause, so the omission of Martin's
subjective belief did not violate the Fourth
Amendment.
Appendix Citation (807 F.3d at 882)
That conclusion directly conflicts with the
precedents of the Fifth, the Seventh, and the Tenth
Circuits—as well as this Court’s opinion in Franks.
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In the Seventh Circuit, not only is an affiant’s
subjective belief about a witness statement’s
credibility relevant, but “[p]olice officers have a duty
to reveal ‘serious doubts’ about an informant's
testimony.” Molina, 325 F.3d at 970. Although the
officer is under no obligation to reveal less-thanserious doubts, see id., in this case, Martin’s initial
decision not to charge Bowden—and especially his
subsequent admissions that he did not find the
apparent trespassers credible—should raise at least a
triable issue as to whether his doubt was serious
enough that it should have been disclosed to a
magistrate.
In the Fifth Circuit, “[t]he reliability of the sources
for [an officer’s] beliefs” presents a factual question
resolved by the jury. Garris, 678 F.2d at 1271. In that
case, a warrant affiant misrepresented certain facts
about an apparent, attempted child abduction as
being within his personal knowledge. Id. at 1267-68.
The officer in that case had not actually witnessed the
attempted crime or spoken to anyone who had; rather,
he later claimed that he had heard the information
from a partner, who had heard it from a school
principal, who had heard it from a parent. See id. at
1267. After the suit, substantial disagreement arose
both over who had told what to whom and over how
reasonable it was to rely on the information. See id.
at 1271. Affirming judgment against the officers, the
Fifth Circuit agreed that this dispute presented a
factual question for the jury. See id.
In Clanton v. Cooper, the Tenth Circuit
acknowledged that whether a warrant affiant relied
in bad faith on a confession he knew was false
presented a triable question of fact. 129 F.3d at 115556. There, an affiant’s warrant “was predicated on an
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oral statement by Clanton’s alleged accomplice, who
later testified that his statement was coerced by” the
affiant. Id. at 1150. The Fifth Circuit acknowledged
that if the affiant “relied in good faith on statements .
. . that turned out to be false, there would be no
Franks violation.” Id. at 1155. But it further
concluded that if the affiant “knowingly and
intentionally swore to the veracity” of the confession
“while knowing it to be false,” that would be a “classic
Franks violation.” Id. Because only a jury could
determine whether he had relied in good faith on the
confession, the court denied qualified immunity. Id.
at 1155-56.
The Eighth Circuit’s holding below flies in the face
of the reasoned opinions of its sister courts. The court
below not only implied that officers have no duty to
alert magistrates as to their serious doubts about the
statements underpinning their warrant affidavits—
the court concluded that this information is
irrelevant.
As this Court noted in Franks, the truthfulness of
an affidavit does not require that “that every fact
recited in the warrant affidavit is necessarily correct,”
but “surely it is to be ‘truthful’ in the sense that the

information put forth is believed or appropriately
accepted by the affiant as true.” 438 U.S. at 154

(emphasis added). The Eighth Circuit’s conclusion to
the contrary is plainly wrong.
II. THIS CASE PRESENTS A QUESTION OF
EXCEPTIONAL IMPORTANCE.
This case presents this Court the opportunity to
provide needed clarification the interaction between
the summary judgment and qualified immunity
standards in cases involving corrected affidavits. This
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clarification will prevent courts from granting
qualified immunity to defendants guilty of
unreasonable misconduct and thereby depriving
citizens of the ability to vindicate their constitutional
rights.
Sadly, police perjury, particularly in warrant
affidavits, is a common phenomenon. Scholarly
evidence suggests that the warrant application
process does not effectively deter police perjury in
warrant affidavits. Stephen W. Gard, Bearing False

Witness: Perjured Affidavits and the Fourth
Amendment, 41 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 445, 447 (2008). In

fact, as Professor Gard recognizes, “substantial
evidence demonstrates that police perjury is so
common that scholars describe it as a “subcultural
norm rather than an individual aberration.” Id. at
448. “[O]verwhelming anecdotal evidence” suggests
that widespread police perjury occurs most often in
pretrial suppression hearings litigating defense
claims of police constitutional violations. See Michael
Goldsmith, Reforming the Civil Rights Act of 1871:
The Problem of Police Perjury, 80 Notre Dame L. Rev.
1259, 1266 (2005). The widespread occurrence of
police perjury requires federal courts to have a clear
standard for evaluating qualified immunity in civil
rights claims resulting from perjurious affidavits—
one that deters police misconduct by permitting
meritorious claims to proceed to a jury trial.
However, substantial confusion and incorrect
interpretation of the qualified immunity standard in
the lower courts has barred the deserving civil rights
plaintiff from the jury. In a recent article, Professor
Karen Blum argues that judges deciding civil rights
suits often misconstrue the summary judgment
standard and resolve factual disputes themselves out
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of a desire to protect government officials from the
hassles of trial that qualified immunity is designed to
prevent, but that in doing so, the judge usurps the role
of the jury. Karen M. Blum, Section 1983 Litigation:
The Maze, the Mud, and the Madness, 23 Wm. & Mary
Bill Rts. J. 913, 940-41 (2015). In other words,
“[r]unaway judges are more common than runaway
jurors.” Id. at 941. Professor Alan Chen argues that
this “central paradox” in qualified immunity doctrine,
the desire to protect officials from baseless suits while
still protecting citizens’ rights, “complicates the
analysis in ways that make the doctrine not only
internally inconsistent, but also extraordinarily
difficult and costly to administer.” Alan K. Chen, The
Facts About Qualified Immunity, 55 Emory L.J. 229,
230-31 (2006).
The Third Circuit has noted that this “tension”
surrounding the respective roles of the judge and jury
is particularly acute in cases involving corrected
affidavits: this Court has classified the availability of
qualified immunity as a question of law, but many
courts have viewed the existence of probable cause to
support a warrant as a question of fact. Sherwood,
113 F.3d at 401. As the Third Circuit has
recognized,“[t]his [tension] may prove problematic in
attempting to resolve immunity issues in the early
stages of litigation where a genuine and material
factual dispute exists concerning probable cause.” Id.
Bowden’s case presents the opportunity to formulate
a clearer standard for parsing the currently murky
interplay between summary judgment and qualified
immunity in cases involving warrant affidavits.
The current absence of a clear standard continues
to cause inconsistent lower court decisions in
corrected affidavit cases. Concurring in the Second

27
Circuit’s denial of qualified immunity in McColley, a
case which yielded three opinions, Judge Calabresi
noted that “our precedents in this area are as divided
as our panel.” McColley, 740 F.3d at 826 (Calabresi,
J.,
concurring).
Judge
Calabresi
succinctly
summarized the confusion surrounding corrected
affidavits, specifically within Second Circuit case law,
but his observations apply equally to the inter-Circuit
split: some cases have held that the weight a
magistrate would give omitted evidence is a question
of fact; if reasonable factfinders could disagree,
summary judgment is inappropriate; but if reasonable
factfinders could disagree, then by definition arguable
probable cause exists. Id. Professor Gard attributes
this inconsistency to an “acute” lack of guidance for
lower courts resulting from still-unresolved questions
after Franks and subsequent major developments in
both Fourth Amendment and civil rights law. Gard,
supra, at 446. Left without “coherent and consistent”
standards, “the only area where lower courts have
been consistent exists in erecting inappropriate
barriers to the vindication of the serious wrongs
perpetrated by perjured warrant affidavits.” Id.
This case illustrates how the lack of guidance on
the interplay between the standards creates unjust
results and deprives a deserving plaintiff of a jury
trial. The Court has long held that good faith must be
touchstone of Fourth Amendment. Franks, 438 U.S.
at 164 (“[W]e derive our ground from language of the
Warrant Clause itself, which surely takes the affiant's
good faith as its premise.”). However, as Professor
Gard observes, lower courts have lost sight of this
original focus and have applied the exclusionary rule
and qualified immunity in cases of bad faith, thereby
“erect[ing] inappropriate legal barriers to the
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eradication of perjurious warrant affidavits.” Gard,
supra, at 484.
In this case, the Eighth Circuit erected such an
inappropriate barrier: the defendant openly admitted
bad faith conduct by the police in causing Bowden’s
arrest without probable cause. Even worse, the
violation of Bowden’s constitutional rights arose, not
from the isolated bad faith of one police officer, but
from a concerted conspiracy reaching the entire local
police chain of command and an elected county
official. Yet rather than allow a jury to evaluate the
facts surrounding such flagrant police misconduct, the
Eighth Circuit conducted its own re-evaluation of the
facts based on its misunderstanding of the summary
judgment and qualified immunity standards. In doing
so, the Eighth Circuit prevented Bowden from
vindicating his Fourth Amendment rights.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the petition should be
granted, the judgment below should be reversed, and
the case should be remanded for further proceedings.
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Before MURPHY, COLLOTON, and KELLY, Circuit
Judges.
______________
COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.
Thomas Bowden sued several law enforcement
officers and the county clerk from Jefferson County,
Missouri, alleging, among other claims, that they
violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment.
Bowden asserts that Deputy Sheriff Vernon Martin
drafted, and the remaining defendants caused to be
drafted, an affidavit in support of a request for an
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arrest warrant that led to Bowden’s seizure without
probable cause.
The defendants moved for summary judgment on
the Fourth Amendment claims based on qualified
immunity. The district court denied the motion, but
we conclude that the facts taken in the light most
favorable to Bowden do not show a violation of his
constitutional rights. We therefore reverse the
decision of the district court.
I.
In a qualified immunity appeal, we have
jurisdiction to resolve purely legal issues based on the
facts assumed by the district court, or facts likely
assumed by the court, when the record is viewed in
the light most favorable to the non-movant. Johnson
v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313, 319 (1995). We therefore
recite the facts in the light most favorable to Bowden.
Benjamin Simmons and Aaron Gyurica were
fishing on a bridge near Bowden’s property in rural
Missouri in 2009. Bowden shouted to the men to
identify themselves, and then fired a shotgun from his
back deck when they failed to respond. After the
gunshot, Bowden and Simmons engaged in a heated
verbal altercation, during which Bowden was holding
his shotgun. Bowden and Simmons each called the
police, and Martin was dispatched to investigate.
Martin first spoke with Simmons and Gyurica at
the residence of Simmons’s grandmother, Barbara
Voyles. Simmons and Gyurica reported their belief
that Bowden shot at them on the bridge. They
explained that they heard a gunshot and then saw
leaves falling in front of them after the blast. Voyles
stated that she could call Howard Wagner, the
Jefferson County circuit clerk, to see what Voyles
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could do.
Martin next spoke with Bowden. Bowden
admitted that he had fired his shotgun, but said that
he shot the weapon in a direction away from Simmons
and Gyurica. Martin relayed these circumstances by
telephone to his supervisor, Corporal Chris Hoffman.
Hoffman ordered Martin to seize the shotgun and to
draft a statement averring that there was probable
cause that Bowden had unlawfully used a weapon.
According to Martin, Hoffman informed him that
a call was placed from Voyles’s residence to Howard
Wagner, the circuit clerk, who contacted Lieutenant
Colonel Steve Meinberg, who in turn contacted
Lieutenant Patrick Hawkins. In Martin’s account,
Hawkins then directed Hoffman that Martin should
be ordered to seize the shotgun and draft the probable
cause statement. Bowden initially named circuit clerk
Howard Wagner as a defendant, but later substituted
the county clerk, Wes Wagner, after discovery
revealed that two calls were made from Voyles’s
residence to Wes Wagner’s office.
After receiving direction from Hoffman, Martin
returned to Bowden’s residence, seized his shotgun,
and obtained a written statement from him. Bowden
explained that he had fired in a direction away from
Simmons and Gyurica after they failed to identify
themselves, because he thought their actions were
“suspicious.” Martin also obtained written statements
from Simmons and Gyurica. They reiterated their
belief that Bowden shot at them on the bridge.
Martin then drafted a probable cause statement,
which read:
1. I have probable cause to believe that . . .
[Bowden] committed one or more criminal
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offense(s):
Unlawful Use of a Weapon
2. The facts supporting this belief are as
follows:
According to the victim’s [sic], they reported
that they parked their pick up truck on a low
water bridge in the area of [Bowden’s
address], to fish off the bridge when a local
resident Thomas Bowden shoot [sic] at them
with his shotgun.
App. 243. Martin later admitted that he did not
personally believe the claims of Simmons and Gyurica
that Bowden had fired a weapon in their direction.
Martin also said that he did not think the facts
established that Bowden had violated any Missouri
law.
The Jefferson County prosecutor obtained an
arrest warrant based on Martin’s probable cause
statement. Bowden learned that the warrant had
been issued, and turned himself in. A Missouri court
then held a preliminary hearing and determined that
there was probable cause to believe that Bowden
violated Mo. Rev. Stat. § 571.030.1(4). Under that
statute, a person commits the crime of unlawful use of
weapons if he “knowingly . . . [e]xhibits, in the
presence of one or more persons, any weapon readily
capable of lethal use in an angry or threatening
manner.” Bowden was acquitted following a jury trial
in 2010.
Bowden filed his amended complaint in this case
against Martin, Meinberg, Hawkins, Hoffman, and
Wes Wagner in December 2013. The amended
complaint alleged, as relevant on appeal, that the
defendants violated Bowden’s rights under the Fourth
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Amendment by causing him to be arrested without
probable cause. The defendants moved for summary
judgment, arguing that they were entitled to qualified
immunity and, alternatively, that collateral estoppel
barred Bowden from relitigating the Missouri court’s
determination that there was probable cause to
believe Bowden violated Missouri law.
The district court denied the motions for summary
judgment. The court ruled that collateral estoppel did
not apply, because Bowden now sought to challenge
the “integrity” of the evidence presented at the
preliminary cause hearing. After noting that Martin’s
affidavit asserted probable cause to arrest Bowden
even though Martin did not believe that probable
cause existed, the court denied summary judgment
because there was “a genuine issue of material fact
regarding the existence of probable cause.” The court
ruled that Martin was not entitled to qualified
immunity because “the qualified immunity inquiry is
identical to the probable cause question.” The district
court did not specifically address the qualified
immunity of the other defendants, but denied their
motion for summary judgment on that issue as well.
All of the officials appeal the district court’s denial of
qualified immunity, and all but Martin appeal the
court’s ruling on collateral estoppel.
II.
Bowden first challenges our jurisdiction over this
appeal. We have jurisdiction over interlocutory
appeals of orders denying qualified immunity if the
appeal seeks review of a purely legal issue. Johnson,
515 U.S. at 313. We do not have jurisdiction to review
“which facts a party may, or may not, be able to prove
at trial.” Id. In this case, the defendants contend that
when the facts are viewed in the light most favorable
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to Bowden, they did not violate Bowden’s clearly
established rights under the Fourth Amendment.
This is a purely legal issue over which we have
jurisdiction. Id.; Sherbrooke v. City of Pelican Rapids,
513 F.3d 809, 813 (8th Cir. 2008). We review de novo
the district court’s decision on qualified immunity,
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
Bowden. Doe v. Flaherty, 623 F.3d 577, 583 (8th Cir.
2010).
Public officials are immune from suit if “their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 818 (1982). A plaintiff seeking damages under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 must show first that the defendant’s
conduct violated a constitutional right and, second,
that the right was clearly established. Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009). In this case, we
elect to consider the questions in that order.
Bowden first argues that Martin violated his
rights under the Fourth Amendment by averring that
he “ha[d] probable cause to believe” that Bowden
committed an offense when Martin did not actually
believe that there was probable cause. Whether
probable cause existed, however, is an objective
question of law. Martin’s subjective belief is irrelevant
to whether his affidavit included sufficient facts to
establish probable cause. Indeed, we have upheld the
lawfulness of an arrest based on probable cause even
where the arresting officers testified that they
believed probable cause was lacking. Warren v. City
of Lincoln, Neb., 864 F.2d 1436, 1439-41 (8th Cir.
1989). Martin’s averment that he “ha[d] probable
cause to believe” that Bowden committed an offense
was thus not a false statement, because the assertion
set forth a legal conclusion not a statement of
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historical fact.
Bowden also argues that Martin intentionally or
recklessly included false statements in, and omitted
facts from, other portions of the probable cause
statement. Much of Bowden’s complaint is without
merit, because it focuses on Martin’s subjective
beliefs. There was no falsehood in Martin’s report that
“[a]ccording to the victim’s . . . Bowden shoot at them,”
because this was an accurate report of what Simmons
and Gyurica told him. That Martin personally did not
believe the men was not relevant to the existence of
probable cause, so the omission of Martin’s subjective
belief did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
Bowden does complain about the omission of two
historical facts: (1) that Simmons and Gyurica did not
actually see Bowden fire his shotgun and (2) that
Bowden told Martin that he fired the shotgun in a
direction away from Simmons and Gyurica. Even
assuming for the sake of analysis that Martin
intentionally or recklessly omitted these facts from his
affidavit, there was no violation of the Fourth
Amendment. If we reconstruct a hypothetical affidavit
that includes these additional facts, see Hawkins v.
Gage County, Neb., 759 F.3d 951, 959 (8th Cir. 2014),
there was still probable cause to believe that Bowden
committed an offense. That Simmons and Gyurica
were not looking at Bowden when he fired does not
establish that Bowden was innocent. Circumstantial
evidence of Bowden shouting at the men and leaves
falling from trees above them after the gunshot could
lead a man of reasonable caution to infer that the gun
was fired at the fishermen. Bowden’s denial merely
created a credibility question; it did not destroy
probable cause.
Even if Bowden’s account had been included and
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believed, moreover, there was still probable cause to
believe that an offense was committed. The Missouri
statute does not require proof that a defendant fired a
weapon at another person. It is an offense knowingly
to “[e]xhibit[]” the firearm in the “presence” of another
person “in an angry or threatening manner” when the
weapon is “readily capable of lethal use.” Mo. Rev.
Stat. § 571.030.1(4). While Bowden denied that he
fired his shotgun at the men on the bridge, he
admitted that he purposefully fired the gun from his
property nearby because the men did not identify
themselves and he thought their behavior was
suspicious. App. 245. There was probable cause to
believe that Bowden knowingly “exhibited” the
shotgun in the presence of the fishermen when he
fired it, see State v. Johnson, 964 S.W.2d 465, 468
(Mo. Ct. App. 1998), that the exhibition was “angry or
threatening” even if the gun was not aimed at the
fishermen, see State v. Rogers, 976 S.W.2d 529, 532
(Mo. Ct. App. 1998), and that the weapon was “readily
capable of lethal use” even if it had not yet been so
used. See State v. Wright, 382 S.W.3d 902, 904-05
(Mo. 2012).
Because we conclude that Martin did not violate
the Fourth Amendment, the alleged conspiracy by the
remaining defendants to cause Martin’s conduct also
does not amount to a constitutional violation.
Slusarchuk v. Hoff, 346 F.3d 1178, 1183 (8th Cir.
2003). We need not address the separate question of
whether any infringed right was clearly established,
although we note that the qualified immunity inquiry
is not identical to the question of probable cause: an
official enjoys qualified immunity for an objectively
reasonable judgment about probable cause that turns
out to be incorrect. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.
635, 643-44 (1987). We also do not consider whether
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there would be jurisdiction to review the district
court’s decision on collateral estoppel, and we express
no view on the merits of that issue.
*

*

*

For the foregoing reasons, the order of the district
court, R. Doc. 85, is reversed, and the case is
remanded for further proceedings.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
______________
Thomas A. Bowden,

Plaintiff,
v.
Steve Meinberg, et al.,

Defendants.
______________
No. 14:12-CV-1824 JAR
Signed Aug. 28, 2014
______________

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
JOHN A. ROSS, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on the
following motions: Defendant Vernon Martin’s
Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 52);
Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
against Defendant Vernon Martin on the Issue of
Liability (Doc. No. 57); Defendants Meinberg,
Hawkins, Hoffman and Wagner’s Motion for
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Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 59); Plaintiff’s Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment Against Defendants
Meinberg, Hawkins, Hoffman and Wagner on the
Issue of Probable Cause (Doc. No. 64); Plaintiff’s
Motion to Exclude or, in the Alternative, to Limit the
Trial Testimony of Diane Damos (Doc. No. 78); and
Defendants’ Motions to Exclude Testimony of
Plaintiff’s Expert Artemis Keitt Darby. (Doc. Nos. 80,
82) The motions are briefed and ready for
disposition.1
I.

Factual background23

Plaintiff Thomas A. Bowden brings this §1983
action against Deputy Sheriff Vernon
Martin (Martin), Lieutenant Colonel Steve Meinberg
(Meinberg), Lieutenant Patrick Hawkins
(Hawkins), and Corporal Chris Hoffman (Hoffman) of
the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office, and Wes
Plaintiff did not file a reply to Defendants’ memoranda in
opposition to his motions for partial summary judgment or his
motion to exclude the trial testimony of Diane Damos.
Defendants did not file a reply to Plaintiff’s memorandum in
opposition to their motions to exclude the testimony of his expert
Artemis Keitt Darby.
1

The factual background is taken from Plaintiff’s Statements of
Uncontroverted Material Facts (PSOF-1, Doc. No.
3 -1; PSOF-2, Doc. No. 65), Defendant Vernon Martin’s
Statement of Uncontroverted Material Facts (Martin SOF, Doc.
No. 53) and Statement of Additional Material Facts (Martin
ASOF, Doc. No. 72), and Defendants Steve Meinberg, Patrick
Hawkins, Chris Hoffman and Wes Wagner’s Statement of
Uncontroverted Material Facts.
(County Defendants SOF, Doc. No. 61)
2
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Wagner (Wagner), Jefferson County Clerk, all in
their individual and official capacities, as well as two
Jefferson County residents, Benjamin Simmons and
Aaron Gyurica.4 Plaintiff alleges Defendants
conspired to have him arrested for the crime of
unlawful use of a weapon without probable cause in
violation of his civil rights. (First Amended
Complaint for Damages (FAC), Doc. No. 41) He
further alleges state law claims of false arrest,
malicious prosecution, fraudulent concealment and
civil conspiracy.
This action arises out of an incident that
occurred on January 29, 2009 in the area of
Plaintiff’s home located at 2120 Seneca Court in
Jefferson County, Missouri. Defendants Ben
Simmons and Aaron Gyurica were fishing from a
bridge crossing Plattin Creek on Seneca Drive.
Plaintiff saw the men fishing and shouted out at
them to identify themselves. Simmons and Gyurica
did not respond. Plaintiff fired a shotgun into the air
from his back deck. According to Plaintiff, he fired
his shotgun in the opposite direction of Simmons and
Gyurica. (Martin SOF at ¶ 9) Following the gunshot,
Plaintiff and Simmons engaged in a heated verbal
altercation while Plaintiff was holding his shotgun.
Thereafter, both Plaintiff and Simmons called 911 to
report the incident. Martin responded to the calls.
Martin went first to the residence of Barbara
Voyles, Simmons’ grandmother. He spoke with
A clerk’s entry of default was entered against Simmons and
Gyurica for their failure to file an answer or other responsive
pleading within the time required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(d)(3). (Doc.
Nos. 16, 17)
4
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Simmons and Gyruica, who told him they heard a
shotgun blast and believed Plaintiff shot at them
because they saw leaves fall in front of them
following the blast. Simmons demanded Plaintiff be
arrested; Gyurica insisted something be done. Voyles
said she guessed she could call Howard Wagner to
“see what she could do about this.” (Martin SOF at ¶
8). Whether Howard Wagner was actually called is
disputed. (See Voyles Depo., Doc. No. 53-7 at 29:1630:1; Simmons Affidavit, Doc. No. 61-5 at ¶ 4(a);
County Defendants SOF at ¶ 8).5 Next, Martin spoke
with Plaintiff at his residence. Plaintiff told Martin
about the exchange with Simmons and that he had
fired his shotgun in the opposite direction of the two
men. He also told Martin about the verbal altercation
he had with Simmons while he, Plaintiff, was holding
his shotgun.
Martin then spoke by telephone with his
supervisor, Defendant Hoffman. Upon hearing the
facts from Martin, Hoffman ordered Martin to seize
Plaintiff’s shotgun and write a report and probable
cause statement for unlawful use of a weapon.
According to Martin, in that phone call Hoffman told
him that “somebody from [the trailer that Simmons
was at] had called Howard Wagner because they had
worked for Howard Wagner.” Martin further testified
that “Howard Wagner, allegedly – and I don’t know
this to be true, but Howard Wagner allegedly called
Pursuant to a subpoena, Plaintiff obtained call detail records
from AT&T showing three calls made to Jefferson County
government telephone extensions during the time Martin was on
the scene investigating the incident, including two to the main
phone number for the Jefferson County Clerk’s office at 9:39 a.m.
and 10:18 a.m. ( Doc. No. 58-9)

5
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Lt. Colonel Meinberg ….who called Lt. Hawkins and
Lt. Hawkins contacted [Cpl. Hoffman] to convey to
me to do a report and seize the weapon and to draft a
probable cause statement charging Mr. Bowden with
unlawful use of a weapon.” (PSOF-1 at ¶ 11e; PSOF2 at ¶ 5e; Martin SOF at ¶ 14; County Defendants
SOF at ¶¶ 4-5) The County Defendants deny having
any communication with each other regarding the
incident. (County Defendants SOF at ¶¶ 2, 3, 7)
Martin’s probable cause statement alleges the
following:
I, Deputy Vernon Martin #242, knowing that
false statements on this form are punishable
by law, state that the facts contained herein are true.
1. I have probable cause to believe that on
7/29/2009, at 2120 Seneca Court, Festus,
Missouri, in the County of Jefferson,
Thomas Bowden … committed one or more
criminal offense(s):
Unlawful Use of a Weapon
2. The facts supporting this belief are as
follows:
According to the victim’s [sic], they reported
that they parked their pickup truck on a low
water bridge in the area of 2120 Seneca Court,
to fish off the bridge when a local resident
Thomas Bowden shoot [sic] at them with his
shotgun.
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(Emphasis added). (Doc. No. 53-5 at 8) Martin later
admitted that after fully investigating the matter, he
did not believe a crime had been committed and that
he would not have written and signed a probable
cause statement but for his supervising officer
ordering him to do so. (PSOF-1 at 11; PSOF-2 at 5).
Plaintiff was subsequently charged with
unlawful use of a weapon, a Class D felony in
violation of RSMo. § 571.030.1(4).6 A preliminary
hearing was held before Jefferson County Circuit
Court Judge Nathan B. Stewart. Simmons and
Martin both testified and were crossexamined by
Plaintiff’s counsel. Plaintiff disputes that his
attorney was given the opportunity to present
evidence at the preliminary hearing. (Martin SOF at
¶ 19 and Pltf. Resp.) Judge Stewart determined that
probable cause existed to charge Plaintiff with
unlawful use of a weapon and bound him over for
trial. Martin testified at Plaintiff’s criminal trial.
Plaintiff was acquitted following a jury trial.
II.

Summary Judgment motions

I.

A. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate when no
genuine issue of material fact exists in the case and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 32223 (1986). The initial burden is placed on the moving
party. City of Mt. Pleasant, Iowa v. Associated Elec.
§ 571.030.1(4) provides that “[a] person commits the crime of
unlawful use of weapons if he or she knowingly: exhibits, in the
presence of one or more persons, any weapon readily capable of
lethal use in an angry or threatening manner…”
6
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Co-op., Inc., 838 F.2d 268, 273 (8th Cir. 1988). If the
record demonstrates that no genuine issue of fact is
in dispute, the burden then shifts to the non-moving
party, who must set forth affirmative evidence and
specific facts showing a genuine dispute on that
issue. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
249 (1986). In determining whether summary
judgment is appropriate in a particular case, the
Court must review the facts in a light most favorable
to the party opposing the motion and give that party
the benefit of any inferences that logically can be
drawn from those facts. The Court is required to
resolve all conflicts of evidence in favor of the
nonmoving party. Osborn v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc.,
853 F.2d 616, 619
(8th Cir. 1988).
II. DISCUSSION
Central to all of the summary judgment
motions is the issue of probable cause for Plaintiff’s
arrest. “The substance of all the definitions of
probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of
guilt.” Green v. State of Missouri, 734 F.Supp.2d.
814, 832 (E.D.Mo.2010) (quoting Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949)). More specifically,
“[p]robable cause exists if the totality of facts based
on reasonably trustworthy information would justify
a prudent person in believing the individual arrested
had committed an offense at the time of the arrest.”
Hoffmeyer v. Porter, 2012 WL 5845094, at *3
(E.D.Mo. Nov. 19, 2012) (quoting Green v. Nocciero,
676 F.3d 748, 751 (8th Cir.2012)). In an action for
false arrest, probable cause is generally a question of
fact for the jury. Dowell v. Lincoln County, 927
F.Supp.2d 741, 756 (E.D.Mo. 2013) (citing State v.
Morgenroth, 227 S.W.3d 517, 522 n. 6
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(Mo.Ct.App.2007).
Nonetheless, to defeat summary judgment
there must be material facts in dispute, “with one
version establishing reasonable grounds and another
refuting it.” Id. (quoting Signorino v. Nat'l
Super Mkts., Inc., 782 S.W.2d 100, 103
(Mo.Ct.App.1989)).
III. ESTOPPEL
As a threshold matter, Defendants argue
Plaintiff is estopped from litigating the issue of
probable cause in light of the Jefferson County
Circuit Court’s finding of probable cause in the
preliminary hearing. Defendants rely on Guenther v.
Holmgren, 738 F.2d 879 (7th Cir. 1984) and Sanders
v. Frisby, 736 F.2d 1230 (8th Cir. 1984), two cases
holding that the doctrine of collateral estoppel barred
plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims for alleged violations of
Fourth Amendment rights because those claims had
already been litigated and decided adversely to them
during state court proceedings. (Doc. No. 56 at 5-8)
Plaintiff responds that a probable cause finding
made in a “summary and cursory” criminal
preliminary hearing does not estop him from later
bringing a § 1983 claim challenging the integrity,
rather than the sufficiency, of the evidence, citing
Whitley v. Seibel, 676 F.2d 245 (7th Cir. 1982).
Plaintiff argues he did not have an opportunity to
fully discover evidence and litigate whether his
arrest was perpetrated in bad faith and in
furtherance of a conspiracy or to appeal the circuit
court’s finding of probable cause. (Doc. No. 75 at 610).
In Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980), the
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Supreme Court held that a federal court must “give
preclusive effect to state court judgments whenever
the courts of the state from which the judgments
emerged would do so.” Id. at 96. In Haring v. Prosise,
462 U.S. 306 (1983), the Court indicated that federal
courts should apply state collateral estoppel law in
determining whether a § 1983 claim is precluded by
a prior state proceeding.
Missouri courts consider four factors in
applying collateral estoppel: (1) the issues in the
present case and the prior adjudication must be
identical; (2) the judgment in the prior adjudication
must be on the merits; (3) “the party against whom
collateral estoppel [is] asserted [must have been] the
same party or in privity with a party in the prior
adjudication;” and (4) “the party against whom
collateral estoppel is asserted [must] have [had] a
full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the
prior suit.” In re Scarborough, 171 F.3d 638, 641-42
(8th Cir. 1999) (quoting State v. Nunley, 923 S.W.2d
911, 922 (Mo.1996)).
Applying these principles, the court in
Guenther concluded that Guenther’s probable cause
claim was precluded by the state court’s
determination of that claim in the state criminal
preliminary hearing where he was able to thoroughly
litigate and challenge issues of the arresting officer’s
veracity and good faith. Guenther, 738 F.2d at 884.
Specifically, Guenther’s counsel rigorously crossexamined the officer regarding his version of the
events leading up to the arrest and called a witness
to rebut the officer’s version. The court heard
considerable testimony from both sides before
making its probable cause determination. The
Guenther court held “[t]here can be little doubt that
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the issue of [the officer’s] veracity and good faith –
the linchpin of [plaintiff’s] § 1983 Fourth
Amendment claim – was both raised and actually
litigated in the preliminary hearing.” Id.
In Sanders, the court determined that Sanders
had fully litigated his Fourth Amendment claims in
the state trial court, but failed on appeal from his
conviction to set forth any assignments of error with
respect to the trial court’s denial of those claims,
thereby waiving them. Sanders, 736 F.2d at 1232.
Under these circumstances, the court concluded that
a Missouri court would give collateral estoppel effect
to the trial court’s ruling on the Fourth Amendment
claims in a subsequent § 1983 action based on the
same claims. Id.
These cases are distinguishable from Whitely,
676 F.2d 245. In that case, Whitely’s § 1983 claim
was based on the arresting officer’s failure to
investigate his alibi and his misrepresentations to
prosecuting authorities that he had checked the alibi
and found it to be false. Unlike in Guenther, Whitely,
presumably for tactical reasons, never raised or
litigated the issue of the arresting officer's veracity
during the preliminary hearing; nor did he raise or
litigate the issue of his purported alibi witness. Id. at
249. The court concluded that the finding of probable
cause at the preliminary hearing did not estop
Whitely from bringing his § 1983 suit for false arrest
because it attacked the integrity, rather than the
sufficiency, of the evidence. In addition, the court
found Whitely’s decision not to raise his alibi defense
at the preliminary hearing did not amount to a
waiver of that defense. The court questioned whether
collateral estoppel would ever be appropriate solely
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on the basis of a preliminary hearing, noting that a
preliminary hearing is a “relatively summary
proceeding, designed only to reach an interim
decision in the process of bringing a defendant to
trial. The suspect has no right to discover what is in
the prosecutor's arsenal, or to appeal the finding of
probable cause. In fact, the preliminary hearing can
be dispensed with entirely and the case taken
directly to a grand jury. Under these circumstances a
suspect may not have had time to prepare his case
when the preliminary hearing is held, or may have
strategic reasons for waiting until trial to make his
defense.” Id. at 249-50.
In the instant case, Plaintiff disputes that he
was able to present evidence and fully and fairly
litigate the issue of the integrity of the evidence
presented at the preliminary hearing. (See Martin
SOF at ¶ 19 and Pltf. Resp.) The Court has reviewed
the transcript of Plaintiff’s preliminary hearing and
in particular Martin’s testimony. (Doc. No. 53-6 at
31:5-51:20) Plaintiff’s counsel attempted to question
Martin on his opinion as to whether or not a crime
had been committed; however, the State’s objection
to the line of questioning was sustained. (Id. at 49:314) Thus, Judge Stewart did not consider the
veracity of the state’s case against Plaintiff. As in
Whitley, Plaintiff’s § 1983 suit attacks the integrity,
rather than the sufficiency of the evidence of
probable cause. Under these circumstances, the
Court concludes that collateral estoppel does not
apply to bar Plaintiff’s suit. “Nothing in Allen v.
McCurry requires us to depart from the traditional
precept that a party is not estopped to raise issues
that he has had less than a “full and fair
opportunity” to litigate in a prior proceeding.”
Whitley, 676 F.2d at 250 (citing 449 U.S. at 95 n. 7,
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100-101).
IV. PROBABLE CAUSE
In support of his motions for partial summary
judgment, Plaintiff argues that Martin’s admissions
that he lacked probable cause to arrest Plaintiff and
believed Plaintiff’s rights were violated are
dispositive of the issue of probable cause.
Specifically, Martin testified on deposition that he
did not believe the facts of the situation fit the
elements of any crime, including any weapons crime
(Martin Deposition, Doc. No. 65-2, 27:3-8, 32:8-19,
38:17-24, 66:22-67:14); that he would not have
written and signed a probable cause statement but
for Hoffman ordering him to do so (Id. at 40:21 -25,
41:1-2, 43:7-44:2); and that he believes Plaintiff’s
rights were violated because “there was no just cause
for this report to even be wrote (sic)” and it was only
written because it was ordered from the top down.
(Id. at 17:18-24).
Defendants respond that because probable
cause depends on an objective analysis of the facts,
i.e., what a reasonable officer could have believed
under the circumstances, see Royster v. Nichols, 698
F.3d 681, 688 (8th Cir. 2012), Martin’s subjective
opinion on the existence of probable cause is neither
relevant nor determinative. Defendants argue that
the facts known to Martin at the time he wrote his
probable cause statement were sufficient under the
objective reasonableness standard. When Martin
investigated the scene, Simmons told him he believed
Plaintiff shot at him because he heard a gunshot,
after which leaves fell from a tree in his immediate
vicinity. (Martin ASOF at ¶ 3) In addition, Plaintiff
admitted firing his shotgun, albeit in the opposite
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direction (id. at ¶ 4), and that he and Simmons had
engaged in a heated discussion after the shot was
fired, during which time Plaintiff held his shotgun.
(Id. at ¶¶ 1-5) Defendants maintain that Martin did
not falsify any of the facts reported to him – his
summary of the victims’ statement is accurate – and
that the only information omitted from his probable
cause statement is his subjective belief that there
was no probable cause to arrest Plaintiff, which
omission is immaterial.
In reply, Plaintiff asserts that Martin’s
subjective beliefs are indeed relevant because the
Fourth Amendment requires an affiant to be truthful
and act in good faith. “[W]hen the Fourth
Amendment demands a factual showing sufficient to
comprise ‘probable cause,’ the obvious assumption is
that there will be a truthful showing. This does not
mean “truthful” in the sense that every fact recited in
the warrant affidavit is necessarily correct . . . But
surely it is to be “truthful” in the sense that the
information put forth is believed or appropriately accepted
by the affiant as true.” Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S.
154, 164-65 (1978). (Emphasis added.)
It is clearly established that the Fourth
Amendment prohibits a police officer from
manufacturing probable cause by knowingly
including false statements in a warrant affidavit. See
Franks, 438 U.S. 154. Here, it is undisputed that at
the time he completed his report, Martin did not in
fact believe there was probable cause to arrest
Plaintiff. And yet, in his probable cause statement,
Martin stated he had probable cause to believe
Plaintiff committed a crime:
I, Deputy Vernon Martin #242, knowing that
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false statements on this form are punishable by
law, state that the facts contained herein are
true.
1. I have probable cause to believe that [Plaintiff
committed the offense of unlawful use of
weapon].
An officer must have a reasonable belief that an
offense is occurring. If Martin had no reasonable
basis for believing that Plaintiff had committed a
crime it, then it was not objectively reasonable for
him to use the information to obtain an arrest
warrant. Burk v. Beene, 948 F.2d 489, 492 (8th Cir.
1991). Under the facts and circumstances of this
case, the Court finds a genuine issue of material fact
regarding the existence of probable cause for the
arrest and will therefore deny the motions for
summary judgment on this basis.
V. STATE LAW CLAIMS
Plaintiff asserts claims against Defendants for
civil conspiracy, fraudulent concealment, false arrest
and malicious prosecution, all of which rely on a
showing that there was no probable cause for
Plaintiff’s arrest. As discussed above, the Court
cannot make a probable cause determination based
on the record before it. Thus, it cannot enter
judgment as a matter of law on
Defendants’ motions on the merits of Plaintiff’s state
law claims.
VI. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
Defendant Martin has also raised the issue of
qualified immunity. To determine whether an official
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is entitled to qualified immunity, the Court conducts
a two-part analysis. First, the Court must determine
whether, “taking the facts in the light most favorable
to the injured party, the facts alleged demonstrate
that the official's conduct violated a constitutional
right.” White v. McKinley, 519 F.3d 806, 813 (8th
Cir.2008) (citing Clemmons v. Armontrout, 477 F.3d
962, 965 (8th Cir.2007)). If a violation is found, the
Court must then analyze whether the right was
clearly established. Id. “To determine whether a
right is clearly established we ask whether it would
be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was
unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Id.
Here, the right in question is the Fourth
Amendment right not to be arrested without
probable cause, a right which is clearly established.
See Habiger v. City of Fargo, 80 F.3d 289, 295 (8th
Cir. 1996). As a result, the qualified immunity
inquiry is identical to the probable cause question.
See Alberternst v. Hunt, 2011 WL 6140888, at *4
(E.D.Mo. Dec. 9, 2011). Because the Court has found
there is a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether probable cause existed, Martin is not
entitled to summary judgment based on qualified
immunity. White, 519 F.3d at 813 (“The party
asserting immunity always has the burden to
establish the relevant predicate facts, and at the
summary judgment stage, the nonmoving party is
given the benefit of all reasonable inferences. If there
is a genuine dispute concerning predicate facts
material to the qualified immunity issue, the
defendant is not entitled to summary judgment.”).
See also Berry v. Davis, No. 13-3610 (8th Cir. August
18, 2014) (citing Nance v. Sammis, 586 F.3d 604, 609
(8th Cir. 2009) (denial of qualified immunity will be
affirmed if genuine issue of material fact exists as to
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whether reasonable officer could have believed his
actions were lawful).
II. Daubert motions
Plaintiff is a corporate airplane pilot. He
claims he has suffered lost past earnings and will
sustain lost future earnings as a result of the felony
gun charge that now appears on a criminal
background check. (FAC at ¶ 37g.) Both sides have
endorsed expert witnesses to give their opinions
concerning the effect of the felony gun charge on
Plaintiff’s ability to earn a living as a
professional pilot.
VII.A. LEGAL STANDARD
The federal rules of evidence and related case law
require that an expert be qualified and that the
expert's testimony be both reliable and relevant. See
Federal Rule of Evidence 702; Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999). The burden of
establishing this predicate for an expert's testimony
falls on the party producing the expert; the trial
court determines whether that party has met its
burden. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc.,
509 U.S. 579, 589, 592, 597 (1993).
An expert may be qualified by “knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education.” Fed.R.Evid.
702. Testimony that is not scientific in nature is
better judged by examining whether the expert has
sufficient personal knowledge, work experience, or
training to support the opinions offered. See
Fed.R.Evid. 702; Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 150-51.
In general, the court's responsibility “is to make
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certain that an expert ... employs in the courtroom
the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes
the practice of an expert in the relevant field.”
Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152.
Reliability hinges on the sufficiency of the
facts or data on which the opinion is based, the
dependability of the principles and methods
employed, and the proper application of the
principles and methods to the facts of the case.
Fed.R.Evid. 702. If the opinion is based solely or
primarily on experience, the witness must connect
the experience to the conclusion offered, must
explain why the experience is a sufficient basis for
the opinion, and must demonstrate the
appropriateness of the application of the experience
to the facts. Fed.R.Evid. 702, Advisory Committee
Notes. To be relevant, the testimony must “assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue.” Fed.R.Evid. 702; Daubert,
509 U.S. at 591.
“Rule 702 reflects an attempt to liberalize the
rules governing the admission of expert testimony.”
Weisgram v. Marley Co., 169 F.3d 514, 523 (8th
Cir.1999), aff'd, 528 U.S. 440
(2000). The Rule “favors admissibility if the
testimony will assist the trier of fact.” Clark v.
Heidrick, 150 F.3d 912, 915 (8th Cir.1998). Doubt
regarding “whether an expert's testimony will be
useful should generally be resolved in favor of
admissibility.” Id. (citation and internal
quotation omitted).
B. Discussion
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VIII.
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE
DIANE DAMOS’S TESTIMONY
Defendants retained Diane L. Damos, Ph.D.,
to address the statements of fact and opinions offered
by Plaintiff’s expert Artemis Keitt (Kit) Darby, opine
on the extent to which the criminal charges against
Plaintiff impact his employability in the aviation
industry, and address Plaintiff’s claims in light of his
documented attempts to obtain employment. (Damos
Report, Doc. No. 79-1 at 2) Dr. Damos is an aviation
psychologist who consults with the airline industry
on pilot selection and aviation human factors. (CV of
Diane L. Damos, Doc. No. 79-1 at 27-51) Based on
her research, review of the materials provided and
her personal experience in the aviation industry, Dr.
Damos opined that the criminal matter would have
“no significant impact on [Plaintiff’s] employability in
the aviation industry after his acquittal.” (Damos
Report at 3-4) First she states that the assertion by
Plaintiff’s expert, Mr. Kit Darby, that Plaintiff had a
100% probability of employment as a vice president
of flight operations by a foreign corporation from the
time of the incident until age 65 has no basis in fact,
is speculative, and cannot be held to a reasonable
degree of certainty. (Id. at 3) Second, Dr. Damos
asserts that contrary to Mr. Darby’s Career Earnings
and Benefits Model Report, no one can say to a
reasonable degree of certainty that Plaintiff will be
unable to obtain a position as a non-flying flight
department manager because of his arrest record.
(Id.) Finally, Dr. Damos states that during the period
from July 2009 to June 2010, Plaintiff was not
conclusively prevented from working as a
professional pilot overseas. (Id. at 4).
In support of his motion, Plaintiff argues it is
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impossible for Dr. Damos to give a reliable and
qualified opinion on the question at issue here for
two reasons. First, she lacks actual real world
experience in hiring pilots. (Doc. No. 79 at 4) Dr.
Damos admits she only teaches how to quantify the
selection of pilots and has never actually been
employed by a private or commercial airline to
perform the pilot screening and selection. (Damos
Deposition, Doc. No. 79-2 at 55:2256:5; 73:23-75:1).
Second, Dr. Damos lacks knowledge and experience
in criminal history background checks. (Doc. No. 79
at 5) Although she acknowledges that criminal
background checks are performed on pilots during
the hiring process and that an applicant’s criminal
history will be a factor in the hiring process (see
Damos Depo., 78:1-7), she does not know whether a
felony criminal charge absent a conviction will
appear on a criminal history background check. (Id.
at 7:14-23; 58:13-16; 60:13-20).
The Court is satisfied that Dr. Damos is
qualified to testify regarding Plaintiff’s employability
in the airline industry based on her thirty-plus years
of general aviation industry experience as well as her
professional experience in teaching and consulting on
the screening and selection of pilots. The fact that
she has not actually worked for an airline does not
persuade the Court otherwise. The extent of an
expert's experience or training goes to the weight of
the witness’s testimony, not its admissibility.
Robinson v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 447 F.3d 1096,
1100-01 (8th Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). Dr. Damos’s relative experience in
the matter at issue may be explored by Plaintiff on
cross-examination. See Minn.Supply Co. v. Raymond
Corp., 472 F.3d 524, 544 (8th Cir. 2006). For these
reasons, Plaintiff’s motion to exclude Dr. Damos’s
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testimony will be denied.
IX. DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO EXCLUDE
ARTEMIS KEITT DARBY’S TESTIMONY
Kit Darby was retained to develop an
employability and career earnings model for
Plaintiff. (Darby Expert Report, Doc. No. 81-2 at 2)
Mr. Darby is a pilot, a former publisher of aviation
industry job availability and salary information, and
an aviation industry career consultant. He is
president of KitDarby.comAviation Consulting, LLC.
(Darby Report, at 2) Mr. Darby opined that the most
probable income loss for Plaintiff is $2,101,739,
which reflects the expected salary, benefits, and
retirement income loss after Plaintiff’s arrest on July
29, 2009. (Id. at 15) He further opines that the
criminal charge puts Plaintiff at a competitive
disadvantage in the interview process. (Id. at 6;
Darby Deposition, Doc. No. 81-1 at 67:1-68:24)
Defendants argue Mr. Darby’s ultimate opinion on
employability is not reliable because it requires
speculation, is not based on experience, ignores
objective data, and provides unfounded extrapolation
from the facts of record. (Doc. No. 80 at 10-12)
Defendants further argue that Mr. Darby’s opinions
regarding impact on employability, based
“somewhat” on common sense and borne out by “the
logic of the common man” (see Darby Deposition,
Doc. No. 81-1 at 195:23-25; 196:1-8), are not helpful
to a jury. (Doc. No. 80 at 3) Lastly, Defendants argue
Mr. Darby is unqualified to render opinions
regarding employability in this case. (Doc. No. 80 at
12-13).
The Court is satisfied that Mr. Darby is
qualified to testify regarding Plaintiff’s employability
in the airline industry based on his thirty plus years
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of experience analyzing the pilot job market, data
compilation, interviews with airline applicants and
recruiting personnel. (Darby Professional
Publications and Biography, Doc. No. 81-2 at 19-39)
Because the airline industry is highly specialized and
regulated, the Court finds Mr. Darby’s testimony
regarding the requirements and qualifications for
employment as a pilot will be helpful to a jury.
Defendants take issue with Mr. Darby’s
underlying data, particularly with regard to foreign
market salaries and benefits. Generally, questions as
to the sources and bases of an expert’s opinion affect
the weight, rather than the admissibility of the
opinion. “Only if the expert’s opinion is so
fundamentally unsupported that it can offer no
assistance to the jury must such testimony be
excluded.” Minn. Supply Co. v. Raymond Corp., 472
F.3d 524, 544 (8th Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted). For
these reasons, Defendants’ motions to exclude Mr.
Darby’s opinions and testimony will be denied.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant
Vernon Martin’s Motion for Summary
Judgment [52] is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
against Defendant Vernon Martin on the Issue
of Liability [57] is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants
Meinberg, Hawkins, Hoffman and Wagner’s
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Motion for Summary Judgment [59] is
DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
Against Defendants Meinberg, Hawkins,
Hoffman and Wagner on the Issue of Probable
Cause [64] is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s
Motion to Exclude or, in the Alternative,
to Limit the Trial Testimony of Diane Damos
[78] is DENIED.
IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that Defendants’
Motions to Exclude Testimony of Plaintiff’s
Expert Artemis Keitt Darby [80, 82] are
DENIED.
Dated this 28th day of August, 2014.
/s/ John A. Ross
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

33a
APPENDIX C
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
______________
No. 14-3074
______________
Thomas A. Bowden,

Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
Steve Meinberg; Patrick Hawkins; Chris Hoffman,

Defendants,
Vernon Martin,

Defendant - Appellant,
Benjamin Simmons; Aaron Gyurica; Wes Wagner,

Defendants.
______________
No. 14-3075
______________
Thomas A. Bowden,

Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
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Steve Meinberg; Patrick Hawkins; Chris Hoffman,

Defendants - Appellants,
Vernon Martin; Benjamin Simmons; Aaron Gyurica,

Defendants,
Wes Wagner,

Defendant - Appellant.
__________________________________________
Appeals from United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis
__________________________________________
ORDER
The petition for rehearing en banc is denied. The
petition for rehearing by the panel is also denied.
October 22, 2015
Order Entered at the Direction of the Court:
Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
____________________________________
/s/ Michael E. Gans
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APPENDIX D
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution:
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.”
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APPENDIX E
42 U.S.C.A. § 1983
Effective: October 19, 1996
§ 1983. Civil action for deprivation of rights
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress, except that in any action brought against a
judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such
officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not
be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated
or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress
applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia
shall be considered to be a statute of the District of
Columbia.
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APPENDIX F
VERNON'S ANNOTATED MISSOURI STATUTES
Effective: August 28, 2007 to August 27, 2010
V.A.M.S. 571.030
571.030. Unlawful use of weapons—exceptions—
penalties—qualified retired peace officers,
identification
1. A person commits the crime of unlawful use of
weapons if he or she knowingly:
(1) Carries concealed upon or about his or her
person a knife, a firearm, a blackjack or any other
weapon readily capable of lethal use; or
(2) Sets a spring gun; or
(3) Discharges or shoots a firearm into a dwelling
house, a railroad train, boat, aircraft, or motor vehicle
as defined in section 302.010, RSMo, or any building
or structure used for the assembling of people; or
(4) Exhibits, in the presence of one or more
persons, any weapon readily capable of lethal use in
an angry or threatening manner; or
(5) Possesses or discharges a firearm or projectile
weapon while intoxicated; or
(6) Discharges a firearm within one hundred
yards of any occupied schoolhouse, courthouse, or
church building; or
(7) Discharges or shoots a firearm at a mark, at
any object, or at random, on, along or across a public
highway or discharges or shoots a firearm into any

38a
outbuilding; or
(8) Carries a firearm or any other weapon readily
capable of lethal use into any church or place where
people have assembled for worship, or into any
election precinct on any election day, or into any
building owned or occupied by any agency of the
federal government, state government, or political
subdivision thereof; or
(9) Discharges or shoots a firearm at or from a
motor vehicle, as defined in section 301.010, RSMo,
discharges or shoots a firearm at any person, or at any
other motor vehicle, or at any building or habitable
structure, unless the person was lawfully acting in
self-defense; or
(10) Carries a firearm, whether loaded or
unloaded, or any other weapon readily capable of
lethal use into any school, onto any school bus, or onto
the premises of any function or activity sponsored or
sanctioned by school officials or the district school
board.
2. Subdivisions (1), (3), (4), (6), (7), (8), (9) and (10)
of subsection 1 of this section shall not apply to or
affect any of the following:
(1) All state, county and municipal peace officers
who have completed the training required by the
police officer standards and training commission
pursuant to sections 590.030 to 590.050, RSMo, and
possessing the duty and power of arrest for violation
of the general criminal laws of the state or for
violation of ordinances of counties or municipalities of
the state, whether such officers are on or off duty, and
whether such officers are within or outside of the law
enforcement agency's jurisdiction, or all qualified
retired peace officers, as defined in subsection 10 of
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this section, and who carry the identification defined
in subsection 11 of this section, or any person
summoned by such officers to assist in making arrests
or preserving the peace while actually engaged in
assisting such officer;
(2) Wardens, superintendents and keepers of
prisons, penitentiaries, jails and other institutions for
the detention of persons accused or convicted of crime;
(3) Members of the armed forces or national guard
while performing their official duty;
(4) Those persons vested by article V, section 1 of
the Constitution of Missouri with the judicial power of
the state and those persons vested by Article III of the
Constitution of the United States with the judicial
power of the United States, the members of the federal
judiciary;
(5) Any person whose bona fide duty is to execute
process, civil or criminal;
(6) Any federal probation officer or federal flight
deck officer as defined under the federal flight deck
officer program, 49 U.S.C. Section 44921;
(7) Any state probation or parole officer, including
supervisors and members of the board of probation
and parole;
(8) Any corporate security advisor meeting the
definition and fulfilling the requirements of the
regulations established by the board of police
commissioners under section 84.340, RSMo; and
(9) Any coroner, deputy coroner,
examiner, or assistant medical examiner.

medical

3. Subdivisions (1), (5), (8), and (10) of subsection
1 of this section do not apply when the actor is
transporting such weapons in a nonfunctioning state
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or in an unloaded state when ammunition is not
readily accessible or when such weapons are not
readily accessible. Subdivision (1) of subsection 1 of
this section does not apply to any person twenty-one
years of age or older transporting a concealable
firearm in the passenger compartment of a motor
vehicle, so long as such concealable firearm is
otherwise lawfully possessed, nor when the actor is
also in possession of an exposed firearm or projectile
weapon for the lawful pursuit of game, or is in his or
her dwelling unit or upon premises over which the
actor has possession, authority or control, or is
traveling in a continuous journey peaceably through
this state. Subdivision (10) of subsection 1 of this
section does not apply if the firearm is otherwise
lawfully possessed by a person while traversing school
premises for the purposes of transporting a student to
or from school, or possessed by an adult for the
purposes of facilitation of a school-sanctioned firearmrelated event.
4. Subdivisions (1), (8), and (10) of subsection 1 of
this section shall not apply to any person who has a
valid concealed carry endorsement issued pursuant to
sections 571.101 to 571.121 or a valid permit or
endorsement to carry concealed firearms issued by
another state or political subdivision of another state.
5. Subdivisions (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), and (10)
of subsection 1 of this section shall not apply to
persons who are engaged in a lawful act of defense
pursuant to section 563.031, RSMo.
6. Nothing in this section shall make it unlawful
for a student to actually participate in schoolsanctioned gun safety courses, student military or
ROTC courses, or other school-sponsored firearmrelated events, provided the student does not carry a
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firearm or other weapon readily capable of lethal use
into any school, onto any school bus, or onto the
premises of any other function or activity sponsored
or sanctioned by school officials or the district school
board.
7. Unlawful use of weapons is a class D felony
unless committed pursuant to subdivision (6), (7), or
(8) of subsection 1 of this section, in which cases it is
a class B misdemeanor, or subdivision (5) or (10) of
subsection 1 of this section, in which case it is a class
A misdemeanor if the firearm is unloaded and a class
D felony if the firearm is loaded, or subdivision (9) of
subsection 1 of this section, in which case it is a class
B felony, except that if the violation of subdivision (9)
of subsection 1 of this section results in injury or death
to another person, it is a class A felony.
8. Violations of subdivision (9) of subsection 1 of
this section shall be punished as follows:
(1) For the first violation a person shall be
sentenced to the maximum authorized term of
imprisonment for a class B felony;
(2) For any violation by a prior offender as defined
in section 558.016, RSMo, a person shall be sentenced
to the maximum authorized term of imprisonment for
a class B felony without the possibility of parole,
probation or conditional release for a term of ten
years;
(3) For any violation by a persistent offender as
defined in section 558.016, RSMo, a person shall be
sentenced to the maximum authorized term of
imprisonment for a class B felony without the
possibility of parole, probation, or conditional release;
(4) For any violation which results in injury or
death to another person, a person shall be sentenced
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to an authorized disposition for a class A felony.
9. Any person knowingly aiding or abetting any
other person in the violation of subdivision (9) of
subsection 1 of this section shall be subject to the same
penalty as that prescribed by this section for
violations by other persons.
10. As used in this section “qualified retired peace
officer” means an individual who:
(1) Retired in good standing from service with a
public agency as a peace officer, other than for reasons
of mental instability;
(2) Before such retirement, was authorized by law
to engage in or supervise the prevention, detection,
investigation, or prosecution of, or the incarceration of
any person for, any violation of law, and had statutory
powers of arrest;
(3) Before such retirement, was regularly
employed as a peace officer for an aggregate of fifteen
years or more, or retired from service with such
agency, after completing any applicable probationary
period of such service, due to a service-connected
disability, as determined by such agency;
(4) Has a nonforfeitable right to benefits under the
retirement plan of the agency if such a plan is
available;
(5) During the most recent twelve-month period,
has met, at the expense of the individual, the
standards for training and qualification for active
peace officers to carry firearms;
(6) Is not under the influence of alcohol or another
intoxicating or hallucinatory drug or substance; and
(7) Is not prohibited by federal law from receiving
a firearm.
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11. The identification required by subdivision (1)
of subsection 2 of this section is:
(1) A photographic identification issued by the
agency from which the individual retired from service
as a peace officer that indicates that the individual
has, not less recently than one year before the date the
individual is carrying the concealed firearm, been
tested or otherwise found by the agency to meet the
standards established by the agency for training and
qualification for active peace officers to carry a
firearm of the same type as the concealed firearm; or
(2) A photographic identification issued by the
agency from which the individual retired from service
as a peace officer; and
(3) A certification issued by the state in which the
individual resides that indicates that the individual
has, not less recently than one year before the date the
individual is carrying the concealed firearm, been
tested or otherwise found by the state to meet the
standards established by the state for training and
qualification for active peace officers to carry a
firearm of the same type as the concealed firearm.

